RANSFORD

// THEORIES & APPROACHES TO STUDY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

AN INTRODUCTION

Approaches to the study of IR refer to the ways by which issues in international politics are viewed. These are broad contending schools of thought, which sharpen perspectives, as well as analysis and the study of IR.

The theories and approaches include:

• Idealism

• Realism,

• Liberalism,

• The English School

• Constructivism

• Marxism,

• Critical Theory

• Post-structuralism

• Feminism

• Post-colonialism

• Global IR,

• Green theory

• Global justice

• Queer theory

• Securitizatiion theory

• Critical geography

• Asian perspective

• Global South perspectives

• Indigenous perspectives 

• Contemporary perspectives on realism.

As international relations has grown in complexity, the family of theories that IR offers has grown in number, which presents a challenge for newcomers to IR theory. However, this introduction should give you the confidence to get started. To kick off, this section will briefly introduce IR theory via a three-part spectrum of traditional theories, middle ground theories and critical theories.

As you read further, you should expect this simple three-part picture to dissolve somewhat – though it is a useful device to come back to
should you get confused.

Theories are constantly emerging and competing with one another. This can be disorientating. As soon as you think you have found your feet with one theoretical approach, others appear.

This section will therefore serve as both a primer and a warning that complexity is to be expected ahead! Even though this course presents IR theory in a particularly simple and basic way, complexity remains. IR theory requires your full attention and you should buckle down and expect turbulence on your journey.

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) set the stage for understanding how and why certain theories are legitimatized and widely accepted. He also identified the process that takes place when theories are no longer relevant and new theories emerge. For example, human beings were once convinced that the earth was flat.

With the advancement of science and technology, there was a significant discovery and humans discarded this belief. When such a discovery takes place, a ‘paradigm shift’ results and the former way of thinking is replaced by a new one. Although changes in IR theory are not as dramatic as the example above, there have been significant evolution in the discipline.

This is important to keep in mind when we consider how theories of IR play a role in explaining the world and how, based upon different time periods and our personal contexts, one approach may speak to us more than another.

All of the theories previewed in this section (and many more besides) are covered in their own section. Traditionally there have been two central theories of IR: liberalism and realism. Although they have come under great challenge from other theories, they remain central to the discipline. At its height, liberalism was referred to as a ‘Utopian’ theory and to some degree is still recognized as such today.

Its proponents view human beings as innately good and believe peace and harmony between nations is not only achievable, but desirable. In the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant developed the idea that states that shared liberal values should have no reason for going to war against one another.

In Kant’s eyes, the more liberal states there were in the world, the more peaceful it would become, since liberal states are ruled by their citizens and citizens are rarely disposed to go to war.

This is in contrast to the rule of kings and other non-elected rulers who frequently have selfish desires out of step with citizens. His ideas have resonated and continue to be developed by modern liberals, most notably in the democratic peace theory, which posits that democracies do not go to war with each other.

Further, liberals have faith in the idea that the permanent cessation of war is an attainable goal. Putting liberal ideas into practice, US President Woodrow Wilson addressed his ‘Fourteen Points’ to the US Congress in January 1918 during the final year of the First World War.

The last of his ‘points’ – ideas for a rebuilt world beyond the war – was the setting up of a general association of nations: this became the League of Nations. Dating back to 1920, the League of Nations was created largely for the purpose of overseeing affairs between states and implementing, as well as maintaining, international peace.

However, when the League collapsed due to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, its failure was difficult for liberals to comprehend,
as events seemed to contradict their theories. Therefore, despite the efforts of figures such as Kant and Wilson, liberalism failed to retain a strong hold and a new theory emerged to explain the continuing presence of war.

That theory became known as realism. Realism gained momentum during the Second World War, when it appeared to offer a convincing account for how and why the most widespread and deadly war in known history followed a period of supposed peace and optimism. Although it originated in named form in the twentieth century, many realists look back much further.

Indeed, realists have looked as far back as the ancient world, where they detected similar patterns of human behaviour as those evident in our modern world. As its name suggests, advocates of realism purport that it reflects the ‘reality’ of the world and more effectively accounts for change in international politics.

Thomas Hobbes is often mentioned in discussions of realism due to his description of the brutality of life during the English Civil War of 1642–1651. Hobbes described human beings as living in an orderless ‘state of nature’ that he perceived as a war of all against all. To remedy this, he proposed a ‘social contract’ between the ruler and the people of a state to maintain relative order.

Today, we take such ideas for granted as it is usually clear who rules our states. Each leader, or ‘sovereign’ (a monarch or a parliament, for example), sets the rules and establishes a system of punishments for those who break them. We accept this in our respective states so that our lives can function with a sense of security and order. It may not be ideal, but it is better than a state of nature.

As no such contract exists internationally and there is no sovereign in charge of the world, disorder and fear rules international relations. For realists, we live in a system of ‘international anarchy’. That is why war seems more common than peace to realists; indeed, they see it as inevitable.

It is important to understand that, despite what the layout of the in this course may suggest, there is no single variant of each theory.

Scholarsrarely fully agree with each other, even those who share the same theoretical approach. Each scholar has a particular interpretation of the world, which includes ideas of peace, war and the role of the state in relation to individuals.

Nevertheless, these perspectives can still be grouped into theory families (or traditions) and this is how we have organised the material in this course. In your studies you will need to unpack the various differences but, for now, understanding the core assumptions of each approach is the best way to get your bearings.

For example, if we think of the simple contrast of optimism and pessimism we can see a familial relationship in all branches of realism and liberalism. Liberals share an optimistic view of IR, believing that world order can be improved, with peace and progress gradually replacing war. They may not agree on the details, but this optimistic view generally unites them.

Conversely, realists tend to dismiss optimism as a form of misplaced idealism and instead they arrive at a more pessimistic view. This is due to their focus on the centrality of the state and its need for security and survival in an anarchical system where it can only truly rely on itself. As a result, realists reach an array of accounts that describe IR as a system where war and conflict is common and periods of peace are merely times when states are preparing for future conflict.

The thinking of the English school is often viewed as a middle ground between liberal and realist theories. Its theory involves the idea of a society of states existing at the international level. Hedley Bull, one of the core figures of the English school, agreed with traditional theories that the international system was anarchic.

However, he insisted this does not mean the absence of norms (expected behaviours), thus claiming a societal aspect to international politics. In this sense, states form an ‘Anarchical Society’ (Bull 1977) where a type of order does exist, based on shared norms and behaviours.

Constructivism is another theory commonly viewed as a middle ground, but this time between mainstream theories and the critical theories that we will explore later.

It also has some familial links with the English school. Unlike scholars from other perspectives, constructivists highlight the importance of values and of shared interests between individuals who interact on the global stage.

Alexander Wendt, a prominent constructivist, described the relationship between agents (individuals) and structures (such as the state) as one in which structures not only constrain agents but also construct their identities and interests.

His phrase ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992) sums this up well. Another way to explain this, and to explain the core of constructivism, is that the essence of international relations exists in the interactions between people.  After all, states do not interact; it is agents of those states, such as politicians and diplomats, who interact.

Since those interacting on the world stage have accepted international anarchy as its defining principle, it has become part of our reality. However, if anarchy is what we make of it, then different states can perceive anarchy differently and the qualities of anarchy can even change over time.

International anarchy could even be replaced by a different system if an influential group of other individuals (and by proxy the states they represent) accepted the idea. To understand constructivism is to understand that ideas, or ‘norms’ as they are often called, have power.  As such, constructivists seek to study the process by which norms are challenged and potentially replaced with new norms. 

Critical approaches refer to a wide spectrum of theories that have been established in response to mainstream approaches in the field, mainly
liberalism and realism.

In a nutshell, critical theorists share one particular trait – they oppose commonly held assumptions in the field of IR that have been central since its establishment.

They call for new approaches that are better suited to understand, as well as question, the world we find ourselves in. Critical theories are valuable because they identify positions that have typically been ignored or overlooked within IR.

They also give a voice to groups of people who have frequently been marginalized, particularly women and those from the Global South. Much of this book’s expansion pack deals with theories set within this larger category.

Marxism is a good place to start with critical theories. This approach is based upon the ideas of Karl Marx, who lived in the nineteenth century at the height of the industrial revolution. The term ‘Marxist’ refers to people who have adopted Marx’s views and believe that industrialized society is divided into two classes – the business class of ‘owners’ (the bourgeoisie) and the working class (the proletariat).

The proletariat are at the mercy of the bourgeoisie who control their wages and therefore their standard of living. Marx hoped for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat and an eventual end to the class society.

Critical theorists who take a Marxist angle often argue that the organisation of international politics around the state has led to ordinary people around the globe becoming divided and alienated, instead of recognizing what they all have in common – potentially – as a global proletariat.

For this to change, the legitimacy of the state must be questioned and ultimately dissolved. In that sense, emancipation from the state in some form is often part of the wider critical agenda.

Post-colonialism differs from Marxism by focusing on the inequality between nations or regions, as opposed to classes. The effects of colonialism are still felt in many regions of the world today as local populations continue to deal with the challenges created and left behind by ex-colonial powers such as the United Kingdom and France.

Post-colonialism’s origins can be traced to the Cold War period when much activity in international relations centred around decolonisation and the wish to undo the legacies of European imperialism.

This approach acknowledges that the study of IR has historically centred on Western perspectives and experiences, excluding the voices of people from other regions of the world.

Crucially, postcolonial scholars have argued that analyses based on Western theoretical perspectives, or that do not take into account the perspectives of those in former colonies, may lead international institutions and world leaders to take actions that unfairly favour the West.

They have created a deeper understanding of the way in which the operations of the global economy, the decision-making processes of international institutions and the actions of the great powers might actually constitute new forms of colonialism.

Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism described how societies in the Middle East and Asia were regularly misrepresented in Western literary and scholarly writing in a way that positioned them as inferior to the West. Postcolonial scholars are, therefore, important contributors to the field as they widen the focus of enquiry beyond IR’s traditionally ‘Western’ mindset.

Another theory that exposes the inequality inherent in international relations is feminism. Feminism entered the field in the 1980s as part of the emerging critical movement. It focused on explaining why so few women seemed to be in positions of power and examining the implications of this on how global politics was structured. You only need look at a visual of any meeting of world leaders to see how it appears to be a man’s world.

Recognising this introduces a ‘gendered’ reading of IR, where we place an issue such as gender as the prime object on our map. If it is a man’s world, what does that mean? How have certain characteristics traditionally viewed as masculine – such as aggression, emotional detachment and strength – come to be seen as essential qualities of a world leader?

Which qualities and characteristics does this exclude (it might be empathy and cooperation) and what kind of actions does this result in? By recognising that gender – the roles that society constructs for men and women – permeates everything, feminism challenges those roles in a way that benefits everyone. It is not simply a question of counting male and female bodies.

Rather, feminists ask how gendered power structures make it difficult for women or men who display supposedly feminine traits to reach the highest levels of power.

Given that those positions involve making life and death decisions, it matters to all of us whether the person who gets there is known for their aggression or their compassion. With all this talk of socially constructed gender roles, you might be beginning to see some overlaps – with constructivism, for example.

We are doing our best to present each approach separately so that you have a clearer starting point, but it is wise to caution you that IR theory is a dense and complex web and not always clearly defined. Keep this in mind as you read on and as your studies develop. Perhaps the most controversial of the critical theories is poststructuralism. This is an approach that questions the very beliefs we have all come to know and feel as ‘real’.

Post-structuralism questions the dominant narratives that have been widely accepted by mainstream theories.  For instance, liberals and realists both accept the idea of the state and for the most part take it for granted. Such assumptions are foundational ‘truths’ on which those traditional theories rest – becoming ‘structures’ that they build their account of reality around.

So, although these two theoretical perspectives may differ in some respects with regard to their overall worldviews, they share a general understanding of the world. Neither theory seeks to challenge the existence of the state; they simply count it as part of their reality.

Post-structuralism seeks to question these commonly held assumptions of reality, not just the state but also more widely the nature of power. Michel Foucault’s contribution to post-structuralism was his identification of the knowledge–power nexus.

What this means is that people in a position of power, including politicians, journalists, even scholars, have the ability to shape our common understandings of a given issue. In turn, these understandings of the issue can become so ingrained that they appear to be common sense and it becomes difficult to think outside of them, leaving room for only certain kinds of action.

Power is knowledge and knowledge is power. By analysing the way in which a certain understanding of an issue becomes dominant, poststructuralists aim to expose the hidden assumptions it is based upon. They also aim to open up other possible ways of being, thinking and doing in international politics.

As this brief introduction to IR theory has shown, each theory of IR possesses a legitimate, yet different, view of the world. Indeed, beyond the theories explored above are many other theories and perspectives that you will find in the expansion pack section of this book. It is also important to note that the theories covered in this course are not exhaustive and there are more that could be examined.

However, the course has provided a good starting point for achieving an overall understanding of the field and where the most common, and most novel, approaches and perspectives are situated. It is not necessary – and probably not wise so early in your studies – to adopt one theory as your own.

It is more important to understand the various theories as tools of analysis, or analytical lenses, that you can apply in your studies. Simply, they offer a means by which to attempt to understand a complex world.

// IDEALISM

The idealist approach is that which strengthens the view that international politics is not about a theatre of war. It regards the relationship that exists between states as one that does not necessarily create disorder and descent into anarchy.

The idealist school is premised on the Wilsonian theory that peace and order can reign in an international system of politics, that is, where there are conscious and sustained efforts to maintain order.

Man as a social being is thus a moral being, and with law to guide the relations and control boundaries, coupled with education which nourishes and ennobles the soul, as well as the presence of a system of law, man can live without anarchy.

Idealism as a school of thought gained currency after President Woodrow Wilson of the United States who, after the First World War, presented some ideals that can promote global mutual understanding, peace and order.

His 14-point Agenda for global peace was a monumental pathway for the creation of an international organization and an enduring international legal order aimed at minimizing international conflict, promoting cooperation among peoples as well as preventing another global chaos as was the case from 1914 to 1918.

Idealism has its antecedents. As early as the 14th century, the Italian poet, Dante had written of the “Universality of Man” in which he envisioned a unified world state. Immanuel Kant had also articulated that ‘doing good’ was an end unto itself, an ideal that gave rise to the moral suasion aspect of international relations.

The Chinese, during the reign of the Chou dynasty in the ancient times, had attempted to create a world state in the Orients. Ancient and medieval empires and civilizations such as the Egyptians of North Africa, Assyrians and Persians in the Middle East, Aztecs and Incas of South and Central America, as well as the Roman Empire of Europe, had attempted to establish a world state.

The idealist school is thus a fundamental prism to look at international relations. Its core submission is that the international system will ultimately transit from the system that it is though a community, into an international society. It stresses the central role of international law, international morality and international organization in the transition.

It is pertinent to note that, the idealist school is an expanding one, which is attractive to a growing number of IR scholars that believe that the world is, with globalization and order created by the United Nations and the many international institutions springing up to bring peoples and actions together in coordinates, already transiting to a world society.

// realism

In the discipline of International Relations (IR), realism is a school of thought that emphasizes the competitive and conflictual side of international relations. Realism’s roots are often said to be found in some of humankind’s earliest historical writings, particularly Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, which raged between 431 and 404 BCE.

Thucydides, writing over two thousand years ago, was not a ‘realist’ because IR theory did not exist in named form until the twentieth century. However, when looking back from a contemporary vantage point, theorists detected many similarities in the thought patterns and behaviours of the ancient world and the modern world.

They then drew on his writings, and that of others, to lend weight to the idea that there was a timeless theory spanning all recorded human history. That theory was named ‘realism’.

Realism is the IR school that is pessimistic about moral suasion in international politics. The realist argument begins with the natures of politics and man. Politics, which principally means the determination of who gets what, when and how, or the authoritative allocation (sharing) of values (resources), gives little or no room for morality or best behaviour.

Moreover, man is by nature selfish and aggressive, and on a matter that involves the sharing of scarce resources over which all are contending, law and order or moral consciousness would be the last recourse. Politics is thus the opposite of morality. Talking about morality and law in “politics” therefore translates to putting a square peg in a round hole: they do not go together.

Against this background, the realist school holds that international relations or politics and by implication the international system have the tendency to be anarchical. Hobbes sums it up this way: bellum omnium contra omnes or the war of all against all.

There may be aggravated anarchy because of three overriding issues that characterize inter-state relation: national interest, national power and military strategy. Indeed, realists focus on these three in their analysis bearing in mind that historical experience has demonstrated these tendencies, and the system continues to show the tendencies.

National interest, a set of objectives a nation has articulated as its principal targets in its external relations, is a primary factor in international politics.

Morgenthau (1962) who has extended the frontiers of political realism in his groundbreaking Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, argues that the main push factor for states in the international community is their uncompromised interest and that consequently, the ambitions of states or the clashes of national interests have made international politics a fertile ground for conflict. National interest is not only an end in itself; it is also a means to an end.

National power is the ultimate aim of states. Power here refers to national values, economic riches, or national wealth and the occupation of a vantage position in the international community. Power also thus becomes an end in itself as well as a means to an end too.

To actualize their interest or gain such value, states conceive of strategic roles to occupy in international politics. This is the national role conception (NRC) which is done at the foreign policymaking stage (Holsti, 1987).

Role conception is a crucial stage in foreign policy as it determines the level of achievement of a state as well as the success or failure of its foreign policy (Folarin, 2010). It is during the role conception stage that variants such as military strategy for the purpose of the pursuit of national power, is considered.

Power thus becomes a scarce but essential commodity for which every state searches. For realists, the conflict of interest, collision of roles, and struggle for power thus make the international system prone to conflict and anarchy. This is why political realism is often referred to as ‘power politics’ as it strongly views international politics as essentially and solely the pursuit or struggle for power among states.

Power politics or the realist paradigm or approach as espoused over the centuries by Sun Tzu, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, E.H. Carr, Von Clausewitz and Hans Morgenthau, among others, contends that the international environment is anarchic and as such national security is the ultimate interest or goal in such an environment.

Nations are thus impelled to make rational power calculations n pursuit of national security such that countries satisfied with the international status quo work towards its sustenance; those dissatisfied with it tend to be expansionist; while friendship or enmity (alliances) are based on the reality of the situation as it affects national interest (realpolitik).

For them, international organization is not borne out of any kind of moral suasion but realpolitik: alliances and ephemeral friendships for the purpose of balance of power capable of deterring would-be aggressors or predators in the global system.

Machiavelli’s words aptly summarize the school of realism: He will prosper most whose mode of acting best adapts itself to the character of the times; and conversely that he will be unprosperous, with whose mode of acting the times do not accord.

// THE PREMISE OF REALISM

The first assumption of realism is that the nation-state (usually abbreviated to ‘state’) is the principle actor in international relations. Other bodies exist, such as individuals and organisations, but their power is limited.

Second, the state is a unitary actor. National interests, especially in times of war, lead the state to speak and act with one voice. Third, decision-makers are rational actors in the sense that rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the national interest.

Here, taking actions that would make your state weak or vulnerable would not be rational. Realism suggests that all leaders, no matter what their
political persuasion, recognise this as they attempt to manage their state’s affairs in order to survive in a competitive environment.

Finally, states live in a context of anarchy – that is, in the absence of anyone being in charge internationally. The often-used analogy of there being ‘no one to call’ in an international emergency helps to underline this point.

Within our own states we typically have police forces, militaries, courts and so on. In an emergency, there is an expectation that these institutions will ‘do something’ in response.

Internationally, there is no clear expectation of anyone or anything ‘doing something’ as there is no established hierarchy. Therefore, states can ultimately only rely on themselves. 

As realism frequently draws on examples from the past, there is a great deal of emphasis on the idea that humans are essentially held hostage to repetitive patterns of behaviour determined by their nature.

Central to that assumption is the view that human beings are egoistic and desire power. Realists believe that our selfishness, our appetite for power and our inability to trust others leads to predictable outcomes.

Perhaps this is why war has been so common throughout recorded history. Since individuals are organised into states, human nature impacts on state behaviour. In that respect, Niccolò Machiavelli focused on how the basic human characteristics influence the security of the state. And in his time, leaders were usually male, which also influences the realist account of politics.

In The Prince (1532), Machiavelli stressed that a leader’s primary concern is to promote national security. In order to successfully perform this task, the leader needs to be alert and cope effectively with internal as well as external threats to his rule; he needs to be a lion and a fox. Power (the Lion) and deception (the Fox) are crucial tools for the conduct of foreign policy.

In Machiavelli’s view, rulers obey the ‘ethics of responsibility’ rather than the conventional religious morality that guides the average citizen – that is, they should be good when they can, but they must also be willing to use violence when necessary to guarantee the survival of the state.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Hans Morgenthau (1948) sought to develop a comprehensive international theory as he believed that politics, like society in general, is governed by laws that have roots in human nature.

His concern was to clarify the relationship between interests and morality in international politics, and his work drew heavily on the insights of historical figures such as Thucydides and Machiavelli.

In contrast to more optimistically minded idealists who expected international tensions to be resolved through open negotiations marked by goodwill, Morgenthau set out an approach that emphasised power over morality.

Indeed, morality was portrayed as some-thing that should be avoided in policymaking. In Morgenthau’s account, every political action is directed towards keeping, increasing or demonstrating power.

The thinking is that policies based on morality or idealism can lead to weakness – and possibly the destruction or domination of a state by a competitor. In this sense pursuing the national interest is ‘amoral’ – meaning that it is not subject to calculations of morality.

In Theory of International Politics (1979), Kenneth Waltz modernised IR theory by moving realism away from its unprovable (albeit persuasive) assumptions about human nature.

His theoretical contribution was termed ‘neorealism’ or ‘structural realism’ because he emphasised the notion of ‘structure’ in his explanation. Rather than a state’s decisions and actions being based on human nature, they are arrived at via a simple formula.

First, all states are constrained by existing in an international anarchic system (this is the structure). Second, any course of action they pursue is based on their relative power when measured against other states. So, Waltz offered a version of realism that recommended that theorists examine the characteristics of the international system for answers rather than delve into flaws in
human nature.

In doing so, he sparked a new era in IR theory that attempted to use social scientific methods rather than political theory (or philosophical)
methods.

The difference is that Waltz’s variables (international anarchy, how much power a state has, etc.) can be empirically/physically measured. Ideas like human nature are assumptions based on certain philosophical views that cannot be measured in the same way.

Realists believe that their theory most closely describes the image of world politics held by practitioners of statecraft. For this reason, realism, perhaps more than any other IR theory, is often utilized in the world of policymaking – echoing Machiavelli’s desire to write a manual to guide leaders.

However, realism’s critics argue that realists can help perpetuate the violent and confrontational world that they describe. By assuming the uncooperative and egoistic nature of humankind and the absence of hierarchy in the state system, realists encourage leaders to act in ways based on suspicion, power and force. Realism can thus be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

More directly, realism is often criticized as excessively pessimistic, since it sees the confrontational nature of the international system as inevitable. However, according to realists, leaders are faced with endless constraints and few opportunities for cooperation.

Thus, they can do little to escape the reality of power politics. For a realist, facing the reality of one’s predicament is not pessimism – it is prudence. The realist account of international relations stresses that the possibility of peaceful change, or in fact any type of change, is limited. For a leader to rely on such an idealistic outcome would be folly.

Perhaps because it is designed to explain repetition and a timeless pattern of behaviour, realism was not able to predict or explain a major recent
transformation of the international system: the end of the Cold War between the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Union in 1991.

When the Cold War ended, international politics underwent rapid change that pointed to a new era of limited competition between states and abundant opportunities for cooperation. This transformation prompted the emergence of an optimistic vision of world politics that discarded realism as ‘old thinking’.

Realists are also accused of focusing too much on the state as a solid unit, ultimately overlooking other actors and forces within the state and also ignoring international issues not directly connected to the survival of the state.

For example, the Cold War ended because ordinary citizens in Soviet-controlled nations in Eastern Europe decided to rebel against existing power structures. This rebellion swept from one country to another within the Soviet Union’s vast empire, resulting in its gradual collapse between 1989 and 1991.

Realism’s toolbox did not and does not account for such events: the actions of ordinary citizens (or international organisations, for that matter) have no major part in its calculations.

This is due to the state-centred nature of the thinking that realism is built upon. It views states as solid pool balls bouncing around a table – never stopping to look inside each pool ball to see what it comprises and why it moves the way it does. Realists recognise the importance of these criticisms, but tend to see events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union as exceptions to the normal pattern of things.

Many critics of realism focus on one of its central strategies in the management of world affairs – an idea called ‘the balance of power’. This describes a situation in which states are continuously making choices to increase their own capabilities while undermining the capabilities of others.

This generates a ‘balance’ of sorts as (theoretically) no state is permitted to get too powerful within the international system. If a state attempts to push its luck and grow too much, like Nazi Germany in the 1930s, it will trigger a war because other states will form an alliance to try to defeat it – that is, restore a balance.

This balance of power system is one of the reasons why inter-national relations is anarchic. No single state has been able to become a global power and unite the world under its direct rule.

Hence, realism talks frequently about the importance of flexible alliances as a way of ensuring survival. These alliances are determined less by political or cultural similarities among states and more by the need to find fair-weather friends, or ‘enemies of my enemy’.

This may help to explain why the US and the Soviet Union were allied during the Second World War (1939–1945): they both saw a similar threat from a rising Germany and sought to balance it.

Yet within a couple of years of the war ending, the nations had become bitter enemies and the balance of power started to shift again as new alliances were formed during what became known as the Cold War (1947–1991).

While realists describe the balance of power as a prudent strategy to manage an insecure world, critics see it as a way of legitimising war and aggression.

Despite these criticisms, realism remains central within the field of IR theory, with most other theories concerned (at least in part) with critiquing it. For that reason, it would be inappropriate to write a textbook on IR theory without covering realism in the first chapter.

In addition, realism continues to offer many important insights about the world of policymaking due to its history of  offering tools of statecraft to policymakers.

//  REALISM AND ISLAMIC STATE

The Islamic State group (also known as IS, Daesh, ISIS or ISIL) is a militant group that follows a fundamentalist doctrine of Sunni Islam. In June 2014, the group published a document where it claimed to have traced the lineage of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, back to the prophet Muhammad.

The group then appointed al-Baghdadi its ‘caliph’. As caliph, al-Baghdadi demanded the allegiance of devout Muslims worldwide and the group and its supporters set about conducting a range of extreme and barbaric acts.

Many of these were targeted at cities in Western nations such as Melbourne, Manchester and Paris – which has led to the issue becoming a global one. Ultimately, the intent is to create an Islamic State (or Caliphate) in geopolitical, cultural and political terms and to deter (via the use of terrorism and extreme actions) Western or regional powers from interfering with this process.

Of course, this means that existing states’ territory is under threat. Although the Islamic State group considers itself a state, due to its actions it has been defined as a terrorist organisation by virtually all of the world’s states and international organisations. Islamic religious leaders have also condemned the group’s ideology and actions.

Despite it not being an officially recognized state, by taking and holding territory in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State group clearly possessed aspects of statehood.

The major part of efforts to fight the Islamic State group has comprised airstrikes against its positions, combined with other military strategies such as using allied local forces to retake territory (most notably in Iraq).

This suggests that war is considered the most effective method of counterbalancing the increasing power of terrorism in the Middle East and
neutralizing the threat that the Islamic State group poses not only to Western states but also to states in the region.

So, while transnational terrorism, such as that practiced by the Islamic State group, is a relatively new threat in international relations, states have relied on old strategies consistent with realism to deal with it. States ultimately count on self-help for guaranteeing their own security.

Within this context, realists have two main strategies for managing insecurity: the balance of power and deterrence. The balance of power relies on strategic, flexible alliances, while deterrence relies on the threat (or the use) of significant force. Both are in evidence in this case.

First, the loose coalition of states that attacked the Islamic State group – states such as the US, Russia and France – relied on various fair-weather alliances with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran.

At the same time, they downplayed the role of international organisations because agreeing action in places such as the United Nations is difficult due to state rivalry.

Second, deterring an enemy with overwhelming, superior force (or the threat of it) was perceived as the quickest method to regain control over the territories under Islamic State’s rule.

The obvious disproportionality of Islamic State’s military forces when compared with the military forces of the US, France or Russia seems to confirm the rationality of the decision – which again harks back to realism’s emphasis on the importance of concepts like deterrence, but also on viewing states as rational actors.

However, the rational actor approach presupposes that the enemy – even if a terrorist group – is also a rational actor who would choose a course of action in which the benefits outweigh the risks.

Via this point, we can see that while the actions of a terrorist group might appear irrational, they can be interpreted otherwise. From a realist perspective, the Islamic State group, by spreading terror, is using the limited means at its disposal to counterbalance Western influence in Iraq and Syria.

The substantial collateral damage of a full military offensive is evidently not a concern for the group’s commanders for two main reasons, both of which may serve to enhance their power.

First, it would contribute to fuelling anti-Western sentiment throughout the Middle East as local populations become the target of foreign aggression.

Second, the feeling of injustice prompted by these attacks creates an opportunity for the spontaneous recruitment of fighters who would be willing to die to validate the group’s aims – this is equally true for those within the immediate region and those internationally who fall prey to Islamic State propaganda on the internet.

It is for reasons such as those unpacked in this case, in regions that are as complex as the Middle East, that realists recommend extreme caution regarding when and where a state uses its military power.

It is easy when viewing realism to see it as a warmongering theory. For example, on reading the first half of the paragraph above you might feel that realism would support an attack on the Islamic State group. But when you read the second half of the paragraph you will find that the same theory recommends extreme caution.

The key point in understanding realism is that it is a theory that argues that unsavoury actions like war are necessary tools of statecraft in an imperfect world and leaders must use them when it is in the national interest.

This is wholly rational in a world where the survival of the state is pre-eminent. After all, if one’s state ceases to exist due to attack or internal collapse, then all other political objectives cease to have much practical relevance.

That being said, a leader must be extremely cautious when deciding where and when to use military power. It is worth noting that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, undertaken as part of the Global War on Terror, was opposed by most leading realists as a misuse of power that would not serve US national interests.

This was due to the possibility that the disproportionate use of US military force would cause blow-back and resentment in the region. Indeed, in this case, realism yielded strong results as a tool of analysis, as the rise of the Islamic State group in the years after the Iraq invasion demonstrated.

Conclusion

Realism is a theory that claims to explain the reality of international politics. It emphasizes the constraints on politics that result from humankind’s egoistic nature and the absence of a central authority above the state.

For realists, the highest goal is the survival of the state, which explains why states’ actions are judged according to the ethics of responsibility rather than by moral principles.

The dominance of realism has generated a significant strand of literature criticizing its main tenets. However, despite the value of the criticisms, which will be explored in the rest of this course, realism continues to provide valuable insights and remains an important analytical tool for every student of International Relations.

//  LIBERALISM

Liberalist approach in international politics flows from the broad liberal ideology which tends to describe the international system as a group of states and non-state actors whose inevitable mutual interdependence ultimately requires social, legal and economic order for states to fully realize their goals.

The liberal school tends to marry some aspects of both the realist and idealist schools. The liberal paradigm agrees with the notion the notion of vulnerability of the international system because of conflicting interests, but sees the need for the establishing of law and order coupled with the organization of states into groups as the most effective way to avert anarchy.

Liberalism is a defining feature of modern democracy, illustrated by the prevalence of the term ‘liberal democracy’ as a way to describe countries with free and fair elections, rule of law and protected civil liberties.

However, liberalism – when discussed within the realm of IR theory – has evolved into a distinct entity of its own. Liberalism contains a variety of concepts and argu-ments about how institutions, behaviours and economic connections contain and mitigate the violent power of states.

When compared to realism, it adds more factors into our field of view – especially a consideration of citizens and international organisations. Most notably, liberalism has been the traditional foil of realism in IR theory as it offers a more optimistic world view, grounded in a different reading of history to that found in realist scholarship.

// The Premises of liberalism

Liberalism is based on the moral argument that ensuring the right of an individual person to life, liberty and property is the highest goal of govern-ment. Consequently, liberals emphasise the wellbeing of the individual as the fundamental building block of a just political system.

A political system characterised by unchecked power, such as a monarchy or a dictatorship, cannot protect the life and liberty of its citizens. Therefore, the main concern of liberalism is to construct institutions that protect individual freedom by limiting and checking political power.

While these are issues of domestic politics, the realm of IR is also important to liberals because a state’s activities abroad can have a strong influence on liberty at home. Liberals are particularly troubled by militaristic foreign policies.

The primary concern is that war requires states to build up military power. This power can be used for fighting foreign states, but it can also be used to oppress its own citizens.

For this reason, political systems rooted in liberalism often limit military power by such means as ensuring civilian control over the military. Wars of territorial expansion, or imperialism – when states seek to build empires by taking territory overseas – are especially disturbing for liberals.

Not only do expansionist wars strengthen the state at the expense of the people, these wars also require long-term commitments to the military
occupation and political control of foreign territory and peoples.

Occupation and control require large bureaucracies that have an interest in maintaining or expanding the occupation of foreign territory. For liberals, therefore, the core problem is how to develop a political system that can allow states to protect themselves from foreign threats without subverting the individual liberty of its citizenry.

The primary institutional check on power in liberal states is free and fair elections via which the people can remove their rulers from power, providing a fundamental check on the behaviour of the government.

A second important limitation on political power is the division of political power among different branches and levels of government – such as
a parliament/congress, an executive and a legal system.

This allows for checks and balances in the use of power. Democratic peace theory is perhaps the strongest contribution liberalism makes to IR theory. It asserts that democratic states are highly unlikely to go to war with one another.  There is a two-part explanation for this phenomenon.

First, democratic states are characterised by internal restraints on power, as described above. Second, democracies tend to see each other as legitimate and unthreatening and therefore have a higher capacity for cooperation with each other than they do with non-democracies.

Statistical analysis and historical case studies provide strong support for democratic peace theory, but several issues continue to be debated.

First, democracy is a relatively recent development in human history. This means there are few cases of democracies having the opportunity to fight one another.

Second, we cannot be sure whether it is truly a ‘democratic’ peace or whether some other factors correlated with democracy are the source of peace – such as power, alliances, culture, economics and so on.

A third point is that while democracies are unlikely to go to war with one another, some scholarship suggests that they are likely to be aggressive toward non-democracies – such as when the United States went to war with Iraq in 2003.

Despite the debate, the possibility of a democratic peace gradually replacing a world of constant war – as described by realists – is an enduring and important facet of liberalism.

We currently live in an international system structured by the liberal world order built after the Second World War (1939–1945). The international
institutions, organisations and norms (expected behaviours) of this world order are built on the same foundations as domestic liberal institutions and norms; the desire to restrain the violent power of states.

Yet, power is more diluted and dispersed internationally than it is within states. For example, under international law, wars of aggression are prohibited.

There is no international police force to enforce this law, but an aggressor knows that when breaking this law it risks considerable international backlash.

For example, states – either individually or as part of a collective body like the United Nations – can impose economic sanctions or intervene militarily against the offending state.

Furthermore, an aggressive state also risks missing out on the benefits of peace, such as the gains from international trade, foreign aid and diplomatic recognition.

The fullest account of the liberal world order is found in the work of Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry (1999), who describe three interlocking factors:

First, international law and agreements are accompanied by international organisations to create an international system that goes significantly beyond one of just states.

The archetypal example of such an organisation is the United Nations, which pools resources for common goals (such as ameliorating climate change), provides for near constant diplomacy between enemies and friends alike and gives all member states a voice in the international community.

Second, the spread of free trade and capitalism through the efforts of powerful liberal states and international organisations like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank creates an open, market-based, international economic system.

This situation is mutually beneficial as a high level of trade between states decreases conflict and makes war less likely, since war would disrupt or cancel the benefits (profits) of trade.

States with extensive trade ties are therefore strongly incentivised to maintain peaceful relations. By this calculation, war is not profitable, but detrimental to the state.

The third element of the liberal international order is international norms. Liberal norms favour international cooperation, human rights, democracy and rule of law.

When a state takes actions contrary to these norms, they are subject to various types of costs. However, international norms are often contested because of the wide variation in values around the globe.

Nevertheless, there are costs for violating liberal norms. The costs can be direct and immediate. For example, the European Union placed an arms sale embargo on China following its violent suppression of pro-democracy protesters in 1989. The embargo continues to this day.

The costs can also be less direct, but equally as significant. For example, favourable views of the United States decreased significantly around the world following the 2003 invasion of Iraq because the invasion was undertaken unilaterally (outside  established United Nations rules) in a move that was widely deemed illegitimate.

Most liberal scholarship today focuses on how international organisations foster cooperation by helping states overcome the incentive to escape from international agreements.  This type of scholarship is commonly referred to as ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ – often shortened to just ‘neoliberalism’.

This often causes confusion as neoliberalism is also a term used outside IR theory to describe a widespread economic ideology of deregulation, privatisation, low taxes, austerity (public spending cuts) and free trade.

The essence of neo-liberalism, when applied within IR, is that states can benefit significantly from cooperation if they trust one another to live up to their agreements.

In situations where a state can gain from cheating and escape punishment, defection is likely. However, when a third party (such as an impartial
international organisation) is able to monitor the behaviour of signatories to an agreement and provide information to both sides, the incentive to defect decreases and both sides can commit to cooperate.

In these cases, all signatories to the agreement can benefit from absolute gains. Absolute gains refer to a general increase in welfare for all parties concerned – everyone benefits to some degree, though not necessarily equally.

Liberal theorists argue that states care more about absolute gains than relative gains. Relative gains, which relate closely to realist accounts, describe a situation where a state measures its increase in welfare relative to other states and may shy away from any agreements that make a competitor stronger.

By focusing on the more optimistic viewpoint of absolute gains and providing evidence of its existence via international organisations, liberals see a world where states will likely cooperate in any agreement where any increase in prosperity is probable.

// LIBERAL THEORY AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

One of the more interesting illustrations of liberalism comes from the foreign policy of the United States during the early twentieth century.

During this period, the United States was liberal, but according to the dominant historical narrative, also imperialistic (see Meiser 2015). So, there appears to be a contradiction.

If we take a closer look we see that the United States was more restrained than commonly believed, particularly relative to other great powers
of that era.

One simple measure is the level of colonial territory it accrued compared to other great powers. By 1913, the United States claimed 310,000
square kilometres of colonial territory, compared to 2,360,000 for Belgium, 2,940,000 for Germany and 32,860,000 for the United Kingdom (Bairoch 1993, 83).

In fact, the bulk of American colonial holdings was due to the annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, which it inherited after defeating Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898.

The United States exhibited such restraint because, as suggested by liberal theory, its political structure limited expansionism. Examining US–Mexico relations during the early twentieth century helps illustrate the causes of this American restraint.

In the spring of 1914, the United States invaded the Mexican city of Veracruz because of a dispute over the detention of several American sailors in Mexico. However, US–Mexican relations were already troubled because of President Woodrow Wilson’s liberal belief that it was the duty of the United States to bring democracy to Mexico, which was a dictatorship. T

he initial objectives of the American war plan were to occupy Veracruz and neighbouring Tampico and then blockade the east coast of Mexico until American honour was vindicated – or a regime change occurred in Mexico.

After American forces landed in Veracruz, senior military leaders and Wilson’s top diplomatic advisor in Mexico advocated an escalation of the political objectives to include occupation of Mexico City – there were also vocal proponents who advocated the full occupation of Mexico.

Wilson did not actually follow any of the advice he received. Instead, he reduced his war aims, halted his forces at Veracruz and withdrew US forces within a few months.

Wilson exercised restraint because of American public opposition, his own personal values, unified Mexican hostility and the military losses incurred in the fighting. International opinion also appears to have influenced Wilson’s thinking as anti-Americanism began to sweep through Latin America.

As Arthur Link points out, ‘Altogether, it was an unhappy time for a President and a people who claimed the moral leadership of the world’ (Link 1956, 405).

By 1919, a pro-interventionist coalition developed in the United States built on frustration with President Wilson’s prior restraint and new fears over the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which gave the Mexican people ownership of all subsoil resources.

This potentially endangered foreign ownership of mines and oilfields in Mexico. Interventionists wanted to turn Mexico into an American protectorate – or at least seize the Mexican oil fields.

This coalition moved the country toward intervention while Wilson was distracted by peace negotiations in Europe and then bedridden by a stroke.

The path to intervention was blocked only after Wilson recovered sufficiently to regain command of the policy agenda and sever the ties between the interventionists.

Wilson had two main reasons for avoiding the more belligerent policy path. First, he saw the Houses of Congress (with the support of some members of the executive branch) attempting to determine the foreign policy of the United States, which Wilson viewed as uncon-stitutional.

In the American system, the president has the authority to conduct foreign policy. His assertion of authority over foreign policy with Mexico was therefore a clear attempt to check the power of Congress in policy-making.

Second, Wilson was determined to maintain a policy consistent with the norm of anti-imperialism, but also the norm of self-determination – the process by which a country determines its own statehood and chooses its own form of government.  Both of these norms remain bedrocks of liberal theory today.

US relations with Mexico in this case show how institutional and normative domestic structures restrained the use of violent power. These institutional restraints can break down if the political culture of a society does not include a strong dose of liberal norms. For example, anti-statism (a belief that the power of the government should be limited) and anti-imperialism (a belief that conquest of foreign peoples is wrong) are liberal norms.

A society infused by liberal norms has an added level of restraint above and beyond the purely institutional limitations on state power. A liberal citizenry will naturally oppose government actions that threaten individual liberty and choose representatives that will act on liberal preferences.

The institutional separation of powers in the United States allowed Wilson to block the interventionist efforts of Congress and others. The liberal norm of anti-imperialism restrained American expansion through the mechanisms of public opinion and the personal values of the president of the United States.

Institutions and norms worked symbiotically. International opinion put additional pressure on American political leaders due to increasing trade opportunities with Latin American countries throughout the early 1900s.

Precisely as liberal theory details, the absolute gains and opportunities offered by trade, together with preferences for self-determination and non-interference, acted as a restraint on US expansionism toward Mexico in this most imperial of periods in world history.

Conclusion
A core argument of liberalism is that concentrations of unaccountable violent power are the fundamental threat to individual liberty and must be restrained.

The primary means of restraining power are institutions and norms at both domestic and international level. At the international level institutions and organisations limit the power of states by fostering cooperation and providing a means for imposing costs on states that violate international agreements.

Economic institutions are particularly effective at fostering cooperation because of the substantial benefits that can be derived from economic
interdependence.

Finally, liberal norms add a further limitation on the use of power by shaping our understanding of what types of behaviour are appropriate.

Today, it is clear that liberalism is not a ‘utopian’ theory describing a dream world of peace and happiness as it was once accused of being. It provides a consistent rejoinder to realism, firmly rooted in evidence and a deep theoretical tradition.

To be continued.............!